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INCORPORATION OF PRIOR RECORD AND BRIEFS
Tomasa Vigil herewith incorporates by reference her prior
statement of facts and arguments based thereon as contained in her
original Brief of Appellant before this Court*
Appellant also recognizes the jurisdiction of this Court as
poured over by Order of the Utah Supreme Court*
Appellant hereby reaffirms her statement of the issues on
appeal as previously set-out and as previously supported, except as
additional argument as to those specific issues are set-out herein*
All references to "Rule11 or "Rules" herein shall mean the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise specifically designated.

PISPUTgp FACTS QW frPPBAI,
The Appellant, Tomasa Vigil, believes that there still remains
certain factual issues from the Record on Appeal (hereinafter
"ROA") which this Court should consider and about which a material
issue of interpretation exists between Appellant and Appellee.
While both parties are citing the same Record on Appeal,
Appellant believes that the following factual issues or conclusions
from

the

facts

remain

in

controversy

and

are

improperly

interpreted, asserted or determined by Mr* Nelson*
1.

There is no factual basis from the Record before this

Court to know whether the trial judge, the Honorable David S.
Young, excluded consideration of the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin
clearly stating the Appellant had suffered permanent partial

4

disability as a result of her collision with Mr. Nelson in October
1987.

See Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin (ROA page 77 to 81).

Two possibilities exist as to this Affidavit.

The first is

that the trial judge did in fact exclude from consideration the
Affidavit; or, secondly, the trial judge did not properly take into
consideration the import or effect of such Affidavit for the
purposes of a Summary Judgment proceeding.

In either case, Mrs.

Vigil maintains that either the failure to properly consider or the
improper exclusion of the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin constituted
material error in this case and should be reversed by this Court.
Mrs. Vigil continues to maintain, for the reasons set-out in her
Brief in Chief and as argued to the trial court, that the Affidavit
of Dr. McGlothlin did not meet the clearly contradictory standard
of Webster v. Seal, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).
2.

Mrs. Vigil further maintains, even if this Court were not

to consider the Affidavit of Dr. McGlothlin, that the totality of
the findings from his written reports [or "reasonable inference"
from those reports -

particularly the September 21, 1992 report

(ROA page 66 - 67)] is that Dr. McGlothlin's pre-deposition
estimate of the total disability of Mrs. Vigil attributable to the
accident was approximately two-thirds (2/3) of her present neck and
back symptoms. This would be the logical deduction or "inference"
in his ascribing one-third (1/3) of her injuries to pre-existing
conditions.

In his September

21st supplemental

McGlothlin states:

5

report, Dr.

11

... I would suggest that it is quite
reasonably probable that at least one-third of
the patient's expressed subjective complaints
as well as clinical objective finding, i.e.,
restricted range of motion, etc., in the
cervical column are reasonably apportioned to
pre-existing degenerative disease."

3.

In addition to both the Affidavit and prior written

medical reports of Dr. McGlothlin, Mrs. Vigil maintains that the
aggregate import of the deposition testimony of Dr. McGlothlin was
that she did, in fact, have permanent partial disabilities directly
resulting from the automobile collision with Mr. Nelson in October
of 1987. While Mrs. Vigil does not wish to reiterate and restate
the previously

cited

portions of Dr. McGlothlin's deposition

testimony to support this premise, she would respectfully refer the
Court to the summary of such testimony contained on page 27 of her
original Brief with specific references back to the portions of Dr.
McGlothlin's deposition contained in the Record on Appeal.
4*

Independently of Dr. McGlothlin's testimony, there are

the prior reported portions of the discovery testimony of Mrs.
Vigil wherein she indicated that the Emergency Room physicians
stated to her that she may suffer some permanent injury as a result
of the collision, but that further treatment would probably not be
effectual due to her age and circumstances (ROA pages 43-44).
5.

Finally, Mrs. Vigil has previously argued, and will

supplement with further argument below, that for the purposes of a
Summary Judgment proceeding her statement that she did not incur or
6

suffer any of the symptoms prior to the collision
admissible.

is fully

This statement should be considered as corroborating

evidence and is not ipso facto excluded (ROA pages 41-42 and 147See also Vigil/s original Brief on Appeal at pages 16-17;

150).

paragraphs 21-23.
6.

Appellant takes exception to the position of Appellee on

the first line of Page 15 of his Brief, suggesting that Mrs. Vigil
is looking around trying to "find" an expert to support her
position of permanent disability. Mrs. Vigil believes that she has
already established permanent partial disability through competent
medical testimony, as well as other corroborating evidence, and
that such suggestion by Mr. Nelson mischaracterizes the Record on
Appeal before this Court.
7.

Mrs.

Vigil

concedes

that

she

has

not,

to

date,

accumulated the $3,000 in medical expenses required by Utah Code
Annotated

§31A-22-309, but asserts that this test is totally

independent of the permanent disability test.

In point of fact,

due to her age and the apparent paucity of specific surgical or
other techniques to treat her condition, there is a possibility
that she may never reach the required threshold medical level.
Whether or not she does reach such standard is not an issue to be
determined at Summary Judgment and should, by the Appellee's own
admission, remain open until the time of trial.

See Jepson v.

State Department of Corrections. 846 P.2d 485 (Utah App. 1993).

7

EXCEPTION TO APPKTJ.KK'S STATEMENT OF RULE 56 STANDARDS
Mrs. Vigil takes exception to the adequacy of the statement by
Mr. Nelson in the Appellant's brief as to the applicable Rule 56
standards. Mrs. Vigil would not disagree with the primary premise
viz: the trial court is to construe the disputed issues of fact in
favor of the party being moved against (Mrs. Vigil) and that the
appeal

court

is to give no deference to the trial court's

conclusions of law, but should review legal issues &§, novo.
Mrs. Vigil's contention, however, is that the applicable Rule
56 standards as properly applied to this case go substantially
beyond this minimal premise, and require the Court to apply the
following additional Rule 56 principles to the resolution of the
facts before it in this case:
1.

Because a remedy (Rule 56) is preemptory, the Court in

considering a Motion for Summary Judgment must view the facts and
all reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light most
favorable to the party being moved against. W. M. Barnes Co. v.
gQhXO Natural pesQuyqg CQ,, 627 P.2d 56 at 59 (1981).
2.

It is not the purpose of Summary Judgment to attempt to

judge the credibility of the averments or the parties, or to weigh
evidence in any manner.

For the purposes of Summary Judgment, it

only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments
and to remove the case from a proper Summary Judgment proceeding,

larass/ supra- at 59.
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3.

In making its determination under Rule 56, it is of no

moment that the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or
even compelling.

So long as there is a prima facia showing of a

disputed issue of material fact, the Court should rule against the
party seeking Summary Judgment, Barnes. supra. at 59.
4.

Because

the

Summary

Judgment

proceeding

effectively

avoids the constitutionally guaranteed right to have matters tried
by a jury of one's peers, it has been the manifest policy of the
courts of this state not to allow Summary Judgment, except in clear
cases when the elimination of a right to trial would not violate
fundamental rights. See FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance
Co., Inc., 594 P.2d 1332 at 1334 (Utah 1979).
5.

Summary Judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy in a

negligence case.
6.

See FMA case, supra. at page 1335.

It should be incumbent upon the trial court to reasonably

articulate the basis for granting a motion for Summary Judgment,
Retherford v. A.T. & T. Communications, 844 P.2d 949 at 958, f.n.
4 (Utah 1992).
Applying the foregoing legal standards to the facts of this
case, it should be apparent that there is a legitimate issue of
fact as to the permanent partial disability of Mrs. Vigil.
It

is of no moment whether

the defendant

has properly

characterized this case as an "improbable" case, or one in which
the present evidence may tend to suggest that Mrs. Vigil cannot
meet her burden of proof at trial. While Mrs. Vigil would disagree
with the Appellee's apparent position, the sole legal issue under
9

Rule 56 remains: "Is there before the trial court a sufficient
quantum of evidence to raise a reasonable question of fact, or
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, to preclude Summary
Judgment."
It would be inappropriate under Utah Law for this Court to
create a doctrine, as suggested by the Appellee, that a basis for
Ruling against Mrs. Vigil under Rule 56 can be found where there
may appear a "strong likelihood" or "high probability" that she may
not succeed at trial.

Such an outcome determinative standard is

manifestly contrary to the law of Summary Judgments as previously
developed by the Appellate Courts of this state.
Finally, within the factual setting for this Summary Judgment
proceeding, Mr. Nelson has repeatedly insisted that Mrs. Vigil's
Affidavit stating she did not suffer any of her present symptoms
prior to the collision should be somehow excluded as incompetent
testimony.

In addition to the authorities previously cited by

Appellant in her Brief in Chief
Bechtel Power Corp.

r

727 P.2d

(see particularly Riggens v.

819 at 824

[Wash. App. 1986])

supporting the general rule that a party may testify as to her own
physical symptoms, the onset of such symptoms relative to the
accident at issue, and the persistence of such symptoms; Mrs. Vigil
would further refer the Court to the cases of Martin v. Douglas
County Lumber Co. r 476 P. 2d 940 at 941 (Or. App. 1970) and Sharp v.
Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.r 118 N.W.2d 905 at 913 (Wis.
1963) to support the admission of her testimony.
In the Sharp case, infra., at 913, the Court held:
10

"The strongest piece of evidence from
plaintiff's standpoint was her own testimony
that she had no symptoms of tennis elbow prior
to the accident."
From the foregoing, it may be seen that for Summary Judgment
purposes the Affidavit of Mrs. Vigil was alone sufficient to raise
a disputed issue of fact, or reasonable inference from fact, as to
the existence of permanent partial disability arising out of the
collision with Mr. Nelson.
Further,

the

submission

of

the

Vigil

Affidavit

has

significance to the Rule 59 issue in that such Affidavit, while
perhaps not critical as a trial issue, was significant and decisive
for a Rule 56 proceeding and was, therefore, improperly excluded or
improperly not considered as new evidence under the applicable Rule
59 standards as applied to a Rule 56 proceeding.

REQUIREMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Mrs.

Vigil

believes

that

the

requirements

of

Rule

4-

501(3) (a) (b) & (c) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
pertaining to Oral Arguments is not discretionary with the trial
court.

Subparagraph (c) clearly states:

"Such requests shall be granted unless the Court finds
that: (a) the Motion or Opposition to the Motion is
frivolous; or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of
issues governing the granting or denial of Motion has
been authoritatively decided." [emphasis
added]

11

In this case, regardless of how the Court may ultimately rule
upon the merits, no reasonable person could believe that the issues
presented to the trial court and fully briefed and set-out were
frivolous.

There is a clear Affidavit, as well as deposition

testimony

of

Dr. McGlothlin,

permanent

partial

disability

supporting
suffered

by

the
the

fact

there was

plaintiff.

A

frivolous claim is, by definition, one which does not have any
basis in fact or manifestly disregards known law and does not
suggest any new or novel application of such law to the facts.
Neither of these badges of a frivolous application are extant in
this case.
The second category which may exclude the granting of an oral
argument under Rule 501-3(c) from a mandatory basis is that a
dispositive issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial
has been authoritatively decided.

This subcategory would seem to

have no application to a fact determinative situation wherein the
Court is not dealing with a legal standard or application which is
definitive, but

is grappling with the proper

application or

interpretation of disputed facts.
Consequently, Mrs. Vigil would assert that the language of
subparagraph (c) of Rule 501 is mandatory in this case and that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying oral argument when
properly requested on the Motion for New Trial. Mrs. Vigil further
believes the previously cited case of Gilmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d
1205 at 1208 (Ut. App. 1991) is instructive in that this Court did
find a denial of the right to file a responsive pleading under Rule
12

501 to amount to an abuse of discretion under that Rule. It was no
less an abuse of discretion to wrongfully deny oral argument on a
final dispositive motion when neither

of the two exceptions

analyzed above are applicable.

RULE 59 AND RULE 52fal STANDARDS
Mrs. Vigil does not wish to reargue or restate prior arguments
as to the application of Rule 52(a) requiring a writing to support
a Summary Judgment ruling or Rule 59 as to the proper basis for
granting a new trial or amending a judgment based upon new facts or
error in the application of the law.

Mrs. Vigil would only reply

to the Brief of Appellee by stating that

it is simply not

sufficient for Appellee to say that Mrs. Vigil's Rule 59 Motion is
merely an attempt to reargue the case.
The Rule 59 Motion is not a reargument when the moving party
informs the trial court that the trial court made a material error
of law and the applicable legal standard to be applied, as was done
in this case.

Neither is it a simple reargument when the moving

party represents to the Court a supplemental Affidavit confirming
under oath the position of the party ruled against. See discussion
above, page 8 and 9, on the factual significance of the Vigil
Affidavit.
In this case there was not an attempt at reargument, but a
failed initial attempt at argument.

The Rule 59 standard was

explicitly upheld and applied to Summary Judgment proceedings in

13

the case of Interstate Land Corporation v. Pattersonf 797 P.2d 1101
at 1105 (Ut. App. 1990) as previously cited.
As to the Rule 52(a) issue of specific findings, Appellant
would rely upon her previously cited authority to this Court and
simply submit that there is no way of determining from the trial
record whether the Judge relied upon a single basis or multiple
basis in reaching its decision to grant Summary Judgment against
this plaintiff; and, therefore, the Rule should have application to
require some minimal Minute Entry or other basis for Ruling.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the prior brief of Appellant and this Supplemental
Reply Brief, Appellant believes there are multiple reasons why the
granting of Summary Judgment was improper in this case, as well as
the failure to properly review under Rule 59 and Rule 501 of the
Code of Judicial Administration, and that this Court should require
this

case

be

remanded

to

the

Trial

Court

for

appropriate

disposition upon the merits.
DATED this 2r>i

day of July, 1993.

U#£v> fr ukt-W^\
JULJ#N D. JENSMf
Attorney for ^ p e l l a n t
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, by placing the same in
the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 2IA\ day of July, 1993,
addressed to:
R. Scott Williams, Esq.
Victoria Kidman, Esq.
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

JULIAN D.
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ADDENDUM OF CITED STATUTE AND RULES

vice or accommodation is not assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile
charge under the relative value study, the value of the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar service or
accommodation in the most populous county of this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a
schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside
the department, if it meets the requirements of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any
patterns of overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions
by a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of
such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of
either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than
three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue
of the reasonable value of the claimant's medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection
31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
(4) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those minimum coverages from
other coverages in the same policy.
(5) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages
required under this section.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159;
1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991,
ch. 74, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "maintaining, and administering" in the next-to-last

sentence in Subsection (2)(a), added present
Subsection (2)(d) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(d) as present Subsection (2)(e) and
made minor stylistic changes in Subsection
(i)( a ) a ^ i n the second sentence in Subsection
(2)(a).

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained
one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured
under the policy;
125

31A-22-309

INSURANCE CODE

(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials,
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307
are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of Vh% per
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
126

shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between tne mburwa.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
re 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8;
1992, ch. 230, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendinent, effective April 29,1991, made minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote

Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured
and not insured under the policy."
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the
beginning of Subsection (1).

PART IV
LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES
31A-22-403. Incontestability.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Estoppel of, or waiver by, issuer of
life insurance policy to assert defense of lack of
insurable interest, 86 A.L.R.4th 828.

31A-22-411. Contracts providing variable benefits.
(1) (a) Any contract which provides for payment of benefits in variable
amounts shall contain a statement of the essential features of the procedure to be followed by the insurer in determining the dollar amount of the
variable benefits. The contract shall contain:
(i) appropriate nonforfeiture benefits in lieu of those required by
either Section 31A-22-408 or 31A-22-409;
(ii) appropriate reinstatement provisions in lieu of those required
by Section 31A-22-407; and
(iii) grace period provisions appropriate to that type of contract in
lieu of those required by Section 31A-22-402.
(b) This individual contract and any certificate issued under a group
contract shall state that the dollar amount may decrease or increase and
shall conspicuously display on its first page a statement that the benefits
under the contract are payable on a variable basis, with a statement
specifying where the details of the variable provisions are found in the
contract.
(c) Life insurance and annuity policies with variable benefits issued
under a separate account shall, on either the application or the policy,
state that the insurer's liabilities with respect to variable benefits under
the policy are subject to satisfaction only out of the insurer's variable
account assets.
(2) Any contract subject to Subsection (1) shall state whether it may be
amended as to investment policy, voting rights, and conduct of the business
and affairs of any segregated account. Subject to any preemptive provision of
federal law, this type of amendment is subject to filing under Section
31A-21-201 and approval by a majority of the policyholders in the segregated
account.
127

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 Utah 2d
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. Newell J.
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr.
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Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973);
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 671 P.2d 201
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v.
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Penrod v.
Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v.
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d 131
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods.
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. &
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial
§ 1077 et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.L.R.3d 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 101.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-

ixigs and may ameuu vu^j^^.^^^
w ^
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are maae
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
—Water dispute.
Findings of state engineer.
Amendment.
—Motion.
Caption.
Conformance with original findings.
New trial.
Notice of appeal.
Time.
Tolling of appeal period.
When made.
—Overruling or vacation.
Another district judge.
Lack of notice.
Child custody awards.
Criminal cases.
Criminal contempt.
Effect.
—Preclusion of summary judgment.
—Relation to pleadings.
Failure to object to findings.
How findings entered.
Judgments upon multiple claims or parties.
Judicial review.
—Equity cases.
—Standard of review.
•
Conclusions of law.
Criminal cases.
Criminal trials.
Findings of facts by jury.
Intent.

Juvenile proceedings.
Purpose of rule.
Stipulations.
Sufficiency.
—Allegations of pleadings.
—Burden on appeal.
—Found insufficient.
Vacation of judgment.
—Found sufficient.
—Opinion or memorandum of decision.
—Recitals of procedures.
—Technical error.
—Ultimate facts.
Summary judgment.
—Statement of grounds.
Waiver.
—Failure of court.
When filed.
—Tardy filing.
Cited.
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
In a contract action by a real estate broker
for his commission, where the defendant raises
the issue of abandonment of the contract by his
answer, the court should make findings on the
issue of abandonment. Failure of the trial court
to make findings of fact on all material issues
is reversible error where it is prejudicial.
Gaddis Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278
P.2d 284 (1954).
—Advisory verdict
The trial court has the responsibility to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
notwithstanding the advisory verdict of a jury.
Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d
392 (Utah 1980).
—Breach of contract.
Where plaintiffs, in action for breach of contract, requested finding by court on material
issue as to whether the foundation of their
house had been located in accordance with zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants, it
was the duty of the court to make such a finding. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Bldrs., Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).
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set aside must proffer some defense of at least
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on
that issue. Downey State Bank v. MajorBlakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).
—Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a
summons, and left a copy with the defendant
which was not the same as the original, the
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion
was created so that a motion to set aside the
default judgment should have been granted
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent
with our declared policy that in case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to
allow trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3
Utah 2d 415, 285 R2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
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promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).
Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran
from the date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather than from the date of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)).
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 1152 to 1213.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to liability against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d
1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and
hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment <^» 92 to 134.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the

practicable ascertain what material facts exist
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Affidavit
-Contents.
-Corporation.
-Experts.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
-Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
-Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Attorney's fees.

Availability of motion.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
r^TTf •
Disputed facts.
Evidence.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
~£°°f;
r
—Weight of testimony.
Improper party plaintiff.
* s s u e °f ^act—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Lease as security.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.

Rule 59

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

162

upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and
shall direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only
from the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Court.
Duty.
Attachment.
Effect.
-Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Court
Duty.
Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110,86 P. 805 (1906).
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-

ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P.2d 943 (1916).
Q w n e r Qr

atto

*
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Trie recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with0 ut action and hearing in equity, and the lien
0 f a n attorney against the proceeds of the judgm e n t does not include his personal right to exe^ ^ t h e j u d g m e n t debtor. Utah C.V.
cute
F e d c * e d i t U n i o n v *J e n k i n S j 5 2 8 R 2 d 1 1 8 7
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment <*=» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.

plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) OR initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
—Punitive damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Grounds for new trial.
—Particularization in motion.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.
Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.

Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
This section requires that the moving party
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174
(Utah 1977).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given.
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
A "surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3).
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah
1979).
Failure to interpose a timely objection to testimony challenged on the ground of surprise
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v.
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982).
Claim of error based on accident or surprise,
never brought to the attention of the trial court
by objection, motion to strike, motion for a new
trial, or otherwise, was asserted for the first

in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15,
[Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15,1991; January 1,1992; February 1, 1993.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment renumbered this rule, formerly Rule
£405; added the phrase beginning "and to" unier "Applicability"; added "Upon initial application, and thereafter" to the beginning of Subjivision (1); in Subdivision (1)(C), inserted the
subdivision designation (i) and added Subdivisions (ii) through (vii); redesignated former
Subdivision (1)(D) as Subdivision (l)(C)(xiii);
redesignated former Subdivision (1)(E) as SubJivision (1XD); redesignated former Subdi virions (1)(F) through (J) as Subdivisions
(l)(C)(viii) through (xii) and in Subdivision
[viii) substituted "existing in Utah or any
uther state" for "in any court of the state";
added Subdivisions (2)(A) through (C), (3), (4),
ind (5)(A) and the first two sentences in Subdivision (5)(B), making former Subdivision (3)
the third sentence in present Subdivision
(5)(B); deleted former Subdivision (4), providing for full faith and credit among courts for
orders qualifying sureties; redesignated former
Subdivisions (5) through (7) as Subdivisions
(5KC) and (D) and (6); substituted "circuit" for
"court" in Subdivision (5)(C); substituted "presiding judge" for "court" in two places in Subdivision (5)(D); substituted "March 1st" for "February 28th" in Subdivision (6); added Subdivision (7); and made stylistic changes throughout.
The 1991 amendment in Subdivision (1)
added "or if the statement is made on behalf of

a business or corporation, a statement that the
business or corporation" to the introductory
language of paragraph (C) and made stylistic
changes; rewrote Subdivision (2) to delete language relating to appraisals and inserted "prepared by a certified public accountant"; redesignated former Subdivision (2)(C) as present
Subdivision (3), added present Subdivision (4),
and renumbered the remaining subdivisions
accordingly, making appropriate reference
changes throughout; in present Subdivision
(3), deleted "audited" before "financial statement" and substituted "surety" for "company"
in the first sentence and substituted "the
value" for "a ratio of bond dollars to letter of
credit dollars" in the second sentence; in
present Subdivision (5), substituted "current
assets" for "real assets" in two places; and rewrote present Subdivision (6) to delete a table
setting out the ratio of bond dollars outstanding to net worth value.
The 1992 amendment substituted "Commercial" for "qualifications of in the rule heading,
inserted "re-qualification and disqualification"
and "commercial" in the Intent section, and
substantially rewrote the rule.
The 1993 amendment, effective February 1,
1993, in Subdivision (6) added the designation
(A), deleted "the lesser of $500,000 or" after
"exceed" in Subdivision (A), and added Subdivision (B).

Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:

To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby design e d as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy;
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any
object matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this
rule.

(Added effective January 1, 1992.)

ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Jjtent:
pTo establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
***** documents with the court.

Rule 4-501
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if appli00"
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall W

cany controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting docuumentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

When rule applies
Cited.
When rule applies.
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a
^Parate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff

should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (l)(b) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
(Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

